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Arbeitspflicht in Postwar Vienna: Punishing Nazis vs. Expediting
Reconstruction, 1945-48
Matthew Paul Berg

Even before the war in Europe ended formally on 8 May 1945, there could be no
serious misconceptions-either among defeated and liberated peoples or among the
victorious Allied powers-as to how complex the challenges of reconstructing physical
infrastructure and social networks would be.1 This was particularly true in urban areas
within what had been Germany's 1938 borders, where the impact of air raids had reduced
many areas to rubble and had damaged the rail and road connections that supplied
foodstuffs and other necessities. In Berlin and other cities, images of people clearing
debris from lunar landscapes dominated the popular imagination in the late 1940s and
over the following decades. Indeed, when images of immediate postwar reconstruction
have been invoked, it would appear as if there existed a heroic, unbroken connection
between the initiative of these largely female volunteers (Trummerfrauen) and the
economic miracle associated overwhelmingly with largely male labor in West Germany a
decade later. If a remarkable preparedness to come to terms with the exigencies of the
present manifested itself during the initial postwar months, historians have subsequently
offered insights into how problematic a consistent and thorough confrontation with the
Nazi past proved to be during the later 1940s and beyond. The tension between a
fundamental readiness to engage in physical reconstruction and a widespread resistance
to addressing ideological reorientation has been explored in various ways in studies
published since the late 1980s.2
Investigation into postwar reconstruction in Austria reveals conditions as complex
in their own right, even though the damage suffered in the former Ostmark was nowhere
as comprehensive as in much of Germany-notwithstanding significant destruction
wrought upon sections of Vienna, Linz, Wiener Neustadt, and a handful of other
locations. These complexities stem in large measure from the tension between Austria's
status as the "first victim of Nazi aggression," as designated in the Moscow Declaration
of 1943, which allowed one to speak of "liberation" in April/May 1945, and Austria's
status as a land of (co-)perpetrators to be defeated, denazified, and controlled, which
evoked the trope of "occupation:' The repression of the latter and emphasis on the former
in the Austrian Second Republic dominated popular and scholarly attitudes toward the
Nazi past well into the mid 1980s. At that point, the Waldheim Affair and the emergence
of Jorg Haider on the right of the political spectrum prompted a number of politicians,
historians, politi- cal scientists, literary figures, and journalists to press for meaningful
Vergangenheitewültigung (coming to terms with the past) through serious academic
inquiry and public discourse.
In the wake of popular reactions to Waldheim and Haider, a host of studies treating
a range of long-neglected or underinvestigated themes in contemporary Austrian history
and identity have begun to advance our understanding of Vergangenheitsbewültigung in
the Second Republic, particularly during the earlier postwar period.3 Moreover, as
archival records have become increasingly accessible in recent years, new works have
taken up immediate post-conflict Austrian reconstruction on the regional and municipal
levels. Such studies either emphasize denazification as a cardinal feature of
reconstruction efforts, or explore the process of removing rubble and rebuilding as the

necessary, cathartic moment in the creation of a new-or renewed-sense of community.
Still other historians have taken up the subject of urban everyday life concerns as
Austrians struggled to create conditions of normality during the ten-year period of fourpower occupation.4 These contributions have shed new light on fundamental elements of
postwar reconstruction, but a systematic and integrative approach to these two
major themes has yet to be written.
This essay offers a step in precisely that direction. It focuses upon the urban milieu
of immediate postwar Vienna as a site where authorities sought to establish a specific
linkage of the political, social, and economic dimensions of denazification with the initial
stages of physical reconstruction-a kind of "expiation through labor"-in the interest of
reestablishing an orderly, democratic political culture in the former Social Democratic
stronghold. Initially the product of mayoral decree, yet sanctioned as federal law by the
summer of 1946, labor service shamed and stigmatized, but also aroused indignant
feelings of victimization among many of those assigned to perform it. This study explores
the ways in which the exigencies of debris removal and basic infrastructure repair
preoccupied municipal officials and federal politicians, and the impact that labor service
had on ex-Nazis and those required to work beside them. At the same time, it takes into
consideration broader Austrian developments, including the relative impact of federal
labor service legislation throughout the Second Republic and the influence of the
occupation powers and the Marshall Plan on mandatory, reconstruction-oriented labor.
While recent years have witnessed an increased interest in Austrian "peripheries"
(Linz, Salzburg, Graz, or smaller communities) at the expense of the Viennese "core: this
essay points to the significance of revisiting developments in the capital immediately
after World War II. The first free elections held after the Third Reich's collapse restored
Vienna's status as a Social Democratic city, yet a large population of former Nazis
resided in the city,5 including many erstwhile Social Democrats who had sought
affiliation with the NSDAP after the Anschluss. Pragmatic reintegration of lesser Nazis
or wholesale exclusion of those who had either found an ideological home or
opportunistic refuge in the Nazi camp became central considerations for the heirs to Red
Vienna's administrative legacy. Postwar Social Democratic city officials could ill afford
to be considered soft on fascism by either foreign occupiers or the more vocal antifascists
among their own constituency. However, a premium placed on the technical or
administrative expertise that many former Nazis possessed and the political/legal ground
rules of a new democratic republic limited the extent to which municipal authorities
might opt for conditional amnesty or punishment.
The above examples, explored in depth throughout this essay, provide a brief
introduction to those tensions prevalent in postwar Vienna. My intention is to strike a
working balance between decisions taken by city officials and federal politicians on the
one hand, and their impact on the life circumstances of those assigned to reconstruction
labor on the other. The context of an urban community entering into a stage of
unprecedented post-conflict transformation affords us fertile ground to explore this
interface, and a wide range of largely neglected archival sources lend themselves to such
an endeavor.
The first section of this essay conveys a sense for the physical damage suffered by
the city and its consequences for residents' lives from mid 1945 into early 1946. It takes
up the matter of Soviet organization of forced labor for initial reconstruction tasks, both

to remedy Vienna's plight and to benefit the Red Army. It also explores the
conceptualization and implementation of mayoral decrees concerning emergency labor
service for what I call "first stage" reconstruction (repair of basic infrastructures such as
gas, electrical, and water lines; repair of streets, sewage lines, and railroad lines; removal
of rubble from public squares, public buildings, and damaged or destroyed privately
owned structures) and the reactions of those affected by it (ex-Nazis, black marketers,
slackers, the unemployed and underemployed). The second section examines features of
the 1946 federal labor service law (Arbeitspflichtgesetz), its implementation, and
representative responses from Viennese residents subjected to labor service. Renewed in
1947 and 1948, the Arbeitspflichtgesetz reflected both the pressing demands of first-stage
reconstruction and the evolution of denazification legislation. The third section assesses
the law's efficacy between 1946 and 1948 in the context of Austria-wide developments,
specific Viennese circumstances, and the introduction of the Marshall Plan and Cold War
tensions. I argue that mandatory labor service in Vienna contributed only marginally to
the success of early reconstruction efforts, so that by mid 1947 through 1948 it brought
negligible benefits. As the 1949 reenfranchisement of those deemed "less-implicated"
Nazis drew closer and first-stage reconstruction tasks had been largely accomplished,
labor service was abolished parallel to the amnesty granted to the vast majority of former
Nazis.
Key elements of the theoretical groundwork for a synthetic approach to
denazification and reconstruction have been laid by historians such as Ela Hornung and
Margit Sturm, Hans-Georg Heinrich, and Siegfried Matti. For example, Heinrich has
argued that political identity and political culture in Vienna have always been determined
more by the social and cultural than either the national or political. This phenomenon had
its origins in the "charismatic power of ... the imperial court, whose presence shaped the
entirety of Viennese society.... Proximity and access to the court determined the social
and thus the economic position of groups and individuals."6 Heinrich's analysis focuses
primarily on interwar Red Vienna, but his conclusion is no less relevant for the Second
Republic, even as early as the immediate postwar period. "Power structures had indeed
changed their form since the end of the monarchy;' he notes, "but in essence their effects
remained entirely comparable. One could say that the emperor took up new quarters in
city hall. The 'court' was the municipal council, and the population was entirely
dependent upon the governing party for access, even to the most minute ramifications of
daily life:' 7
As Viennese, together with initially Soviet and later four-power occupation forces,
began to establish a semblance of postwar order, district and central municipal
administrative power concentrated itself largely in Social Democratic hands. This was not
surprising, given the strength of the city's Social Democratic political machine between
1919 and 1934. Yet it is remarkable that the Social Democratic municipal organization
reemerged with such speed and resiliency in the late spring and summer of 1945. Four
years of a repressive, indigenous authoritarian government had driven Viennese Social
Democrats underground or into exile, and the Nazi regime demonstrated an even more
brutal intolerance toward them-even as it offered itself as a new home for many who
were prepared to change their political colors. Siegfried Matti accounts for this strength
and resiliency when he remarks that the Viennese Social Democratic organization "had
discovered in its system of 'ward heelers' (Vertrauensmünner and Vertrauensfrauen) a

unique model for combining highly professionalized and bureaucratic party structures
with face-to-face interactions among its members. These party operatives were, to use
Antonio Gramsci's terminology, 'organic intellectuals' who were able to straddle the line
separating the logic of modern organizational apparatuses from the logic of everyday
life.8
Election results in November 1945 evinced the strength of the party organization
and its appeal to voters. In Vienna's twenty-six districts (the total changed with
redistricting in 1954), the Social Democrats controlled all but six outright during the first
several postwar years, and over subsequent decades this dominance did not change
significantly. Vertrauensleute represented the party's specific interests as party officials,
and the Bezirksvorsteher retained their high-profile Social Democratic identities as city
district administrators at the local level. However, it was not uncommon for district
administrators to exercise responsibilities as "ward heelers" as well, or to have emerged
to political prominence in this capacity; such individuals likely understood the sentiments
of their party colleagues/constituents far more intimately than municipal bureaucrats
might have. This, in turn, could contribute to certain tensions between the city
administration and individual district officials. For example, the latter more often than not
embraced the strict antifascist measures handed down from city hall prior to the
introduction of denazification legislation and readily implemented them as obvious and
natural. Upon the introduction of such legislation, however, the municipal
administration's insistence upon adherence to the new republic's spirit of democratic
republican legality could be perceived as insufficiently antifascist by Bezirksvorsteher
and Social Democratic Vertrauensleute. It was at these moments that those subjected to
labor service issued pleas for redress directly to the mayor's office over the heads of
"oppressive" district administrators. The tone of their supplications bears out Heinrich's
observation of a shift in the locus of power from the imperial court to city hall.
Confronting Former Nazis and War-Related Destruction in Vienna, May-December
1945
Although Vienna did not suffer the scale of destruction absorbed by Berlin,
Dresden, Hamburg, or other German-speaking population centers, the city by no means
emerged unscathed. Combat during the final weeks of the war in Austria inflicted
structural damage on Vienna's historic city center, as well as parts of its eastern,
southeastern, and northern districts. Moreover, the frequency and intensity of Allied
bombing reached unprecedented levels during the later part of 1944 as air raids struck the
city's rail centers and Danube shipping installations in particular. Of course, many bombs
wrought serious damage-or wholesale destruction-upon housing stock and public
buildings. The municipal administration estimated that 41 percent of all buildings in the
Gemeinde Wien suffered some form of damage-that is, either destroyed completely,
rendered largely uninhabitable, or in need of significant repair.9 An investigation
completed in late 1945 revealed that 36,851 structures had been destroyed-including
private as well as municipally owned and administered apartment houses, in addition to
city and state administrative buildings-while another 50,024 additional edifices in these
categories had suffered significant damage.10 The Municipal Housing Office
(Wohnungsamt) estimated that approximately 100,000 housing units (single family
houses and individual apartments) had been destroyed or rendered otherwise

uninhabitable-a figure that corresponded roughly to the total number of lost or damaged
housing units in Linz, Salzburg, Innsbruck, and Bregenz combined.11 Subsequent
investigations identified far-reaching damage to Vienna's transportation network through
the destruction of roadways and the bombing of the southern, western, and northern
railway stations and hundreds of kilometers of track and some 135 bridges (primarily
over the Danube and Wienfluss). Authorities estimated that some 850,000 cubic meters
of rubble littered the city in April 1945-a quantity that increased as damaged buildings
subsequently collapsed or were torn down to eliminate safety hazards and to clear space
for new construction in the later 1940s.12 Moreover, the city's extensive sewage network
suffered damage at almost 1,700 locations.13
Efforts to clear rubble and debris and to bury bodies during the first month of
occupation in Vienna proceeded generally at the impetus of the Soviet occupation forces,
and even then in a seemingly haphazard fashion. Prevailing practice took the form of
stationing soldiers at the corners of busy streets in order to detain pedestrians for labor
service. The behavior of Soviet troops was less a question of wanton intimidation than an
effort to secure labor for reconstruction during a period when the municipal departments
had ceased to function cohesively. In an effort to regulate the deployment of workers
systematically, the then -provisional Social Democratic mayor Theodor Korner urged the
various Viennese district administrators (Bezirksvorsteher) in a note of 7 May 1945 to
inform Soviet authorities which individuals or groups would be available for work
details. Korner's decision took three factors into consideration. First, he maintained that
the health of potential workers should be a central concern in selection. Second,
individuals already employed in sectors important to the reconstruction effort should not
be removed from their workshops or firms if their labor contributed meaningfully to
reconstruction. Finally, in the interest of minimizing friction between Red Army forces
and the civil population, Korner maintained that the oppressive arbitrariness of selection,
as perceived by the Viennese, should be abolished.14 In some cases individuals subjected
to "wild requisitioning" had disappeared for several days, during which they were
engaged in building bridges and creating roads, driving animals, and a variety of clean-up
tasks under extremely taxing circumstances.15 Korner's decree, issued with the blessings
of the Soviet commandant, did not make labor service any more popular among city
residents. Nonetheless, it introduced a critical measure of order and established the
municipal authority as a negotiating partner with the Allies and as an advocate for
Vienna's population. Arbitrary detainment at the hands of Soviet troops did not cease
altogether,16 but its frequency diminished considerably.
The second-and in some respects more decisive-policy shift concerning labor
allocation followed the introduction of the Verbotsgesetz (Prohibition Law). According
to this federal legislation passed by the provisional government with Allied Council
approval on 8 May 1945,17 individuals with an established primary residence on Austrian
territory between 1 July 1933 and 27 April 1945 who had become Nazi party members,
members of its military formations (the SS, SA, or Nazi military officers' association), or
had been leading functionaries in other Nazi organizations or in district or local
administration, were required to register with Austrian and Allied authorities. The total
number of those affected reached approximately 536,000. These people found themselves
deprived of the rights to vote and hold political office and were excluded from a range of
employment positions in the public and private sectors. Between May 1945 and the

revision of denazification legislation in 1946/47, individuals required to register could, in
limited cases, become members of one of the three recognized democratic political
parties: the Austrian Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Osterreichs, KPO), the
Austrian People's Party (Osterreichische Volkspartei, OVP), or the Austrian Socialist
Party (Sozialistische Partei Osterreichs, SP0).18 Austrians over eighteen who had joined
the NSDAP between l July 1933, when the Nazi Party was outlawed by the authoritarian
Catholic-conservative regime, and the 13 March 1938 Anschluss-the so-called Illegalencould be charged with treason and sentenced to between five and ten years imprisonment.
For many antifascists, this significant number of former Nazis (widely referred to as
Ehemalige) represented a logical labor pool for basic reconstruction tasks that, in the
weeks since the collapse of the Third Reich's authority, had not been utilized widely or
consistently.
In his position as mayor of the city and governor of the province of Vienna, Korneralong with other provisional provincial governors in eastern Austria-received notification
in early June 1945 that the Soviet occupation force had insisted upon the allocation of
labor to resolve specific reconstruction problems. This would be accomplished in
cooperation with Franz Hanner (KPO), provisional state secretary for the interior, who
assumed the responsibility of systematizing the introduction of Ehemalige into labor
service. Tasks to which they would be directed included addressing sanitary conditions in
order to combat the spread of disease, clearance and repair of damage to transportation
networks, and restoration of all the various public institutions to working order. Insofar as
it was possible, the Austrian Provisional Government and the Soviets favored
employment of former Nazis, using the recently introduced denazification legislation as a
guide to identifying potential laborers. The law stated:
In the first instance, the so-called Illegalen as per §10 and §11 under the constitutional law [of 8
May 1945], those people who were members of the SS, functionaries within the party or its related
associations, leaders of paramilitary groups at the rank of Untersturmführer or its equivalent and
higher, and finally anyone who did not belong to the above circles, but who behaved in a fashion
that violated basic principles of humanity for personal gain or other objectionable motives are to be
enlisted [for labor].
Members of the [National Socialist] party and its associations and party applicants who did not hold
positions of authority are to be enlisted ... in those cases when either sufficient numbers of heavily
implicated [belastet] National Socialists are not available, or such individuals cannot verify regular
employment.19

While a punitive consideration to summoning the Illegalen and the otherwise heavily
implicated Ehemaligen undoubtedly existed, Austrian authorities determined that, in
order to distinguish the new Austrian authorities from the Nazi regime, compulsory labor
service for reconstruction could not violate basic human rights. For instance, people
under age sixteen or over sixty-five were not required to appear for work details, nor
were those who could demonstrate that their physical conditions prevented them from
engaging in difficult manual labor. Moreover, the Ehemaligen were not, under any
circumstances, to be singled out with special symbols or designations (for example, a
swastika on their clothing); this was deemed incompatible with the new, democratic
Austria's protection of fundamental human dignity.20 Further, the office of the
Provisional State Secretary for Social Administration (soziale Verwaltung) had insisted
that former Nazis compelled to engage in labor service would be compensated at the

going daily rate for workers employed in comparable tasks.21 In order to prioritize labor
allocation, Ehemalige would be required to provide provincial labor offices
(Landesarbeitsümter) with proof of employment; in instances of noncompliance,
Austrian authorities could withhold ration cards.22 Unemployed Belastete and lessimplicated Ehemalige would be inducted into labor service first, followed by their former
party comrades whose jobs were deemed of little or no importance to reconstruction
efforts.23
Despite this new directive, progress toward amassing sufficient labor for basic
reconstruction projects proceeded haltingly during the summer of 1945. Several factors
are obvious. Registration of Nazis with the Austrian authorities and occupation regimes
required considerable personnel. Questionnaires had to be vetted, supporting
documentation reviewed, and corroborating evidence verified before potential
reconstruction laborers could be identified. Further, in Vienna-as in the rest of Austria-the
vast majority of local, provincial, and federal civil servants had been NSDAP members.
To purge the bureaucracy and replace Nazis with reliable antifascists would require more
than just the several weeks following the cessation of hostilities. Korner did not
sympathize with National Socialists in the least, but he feared that a purge of all party
members and member candidates (Parteimitglieder and Parteianwürter) from the
municipal bureaucracy would introduce administrative paralysis,24 with implications for
the various authorities involved in the recruitment and allocation of workers, including
the municipal police force (Polizeidirektion Wien), the Landesarbeitsamt, and those
municipal departments (Magistratsabteilungen) responsible for priority reconstruction.
Beyond these structural difficulties lay a different kind of problem, however. After
long years of war and its accompanying hardships, many Viennese wanted nothing more
than to relax and try to enjoy the coming of the peace to the extent that circumstances
permitted. As the weather turned warm and sunny, the newspaper Neues Osterreich
commented bitterly: "[R]ather than dedicate themselves to the far more important tasks of
rebuilding our home- land[,]" large crowds began to congregate daily along the banks of
the Danube. "[T]his will not do, of course.... It cannot be expected of working people ...
that they support non-working people through their labor. Thus, it would be most
welcome if ... food ration cards were only distributed to those willing to work.... If we all
did the same as the summer sunbathers along the Danube, then we will all go to the dogs
together:' 25 Not surprisingly, Neues Osterreich added Schlurfs to the list of those social
forces who acted as a brake upon reconstruction initiatives. These primarily young, ablebodied male "slackers" preferred to congregate in coffee houses, dance halls, and cabarets
whenever possible and maintained themselves through black market activity rather than
through legitimate work at necessary tasks.26
By August 1945 it had become clear to Viennese municipal authorities, the
Austrian provisional government, and all four Allied occupation powers that measures to
jump-start reconstruction work had done little to meet even the most modest
expectations. This prompted Korner to secure federal and four-power support to issue a
public summons for the employment of men and women with a permanent residence in
Vienna, both Ehemalige and non-Nazi alike, in emergency labor service
(Notstandsarbeit) during the month of September. Under the categories of Illegalen and
Belasteten (§4 and §12 of the Verbotsgesetz from 8 May 1945, respectively), unemployed
males between the ages of sixteen and sixty-five and women between fifteen and fifty-

five would complete one hundred and twenty hours of labor service. For lesser Nazis and
anyone not engaged in work deemed essential to reconstruction, unemployed males
between the ages of fifteen and fifty and women between sixteen and forty would fulfill a
total of sixty hours-forty hours if they still attended school. Those who worked full-time
in sectors not considered vital for reconstruction would complete sixteen hours, but
thirty-two hours if they belonged to the circles designated in §4 or §12. All workers
would enjoy both health and accident insurance, provided by the city of Vienna,
throughout the period of their employment. Those attempting to shirk this responsibility
could reckon with a reduction in-or even revocation of-ration cards for the four-week
period of emergency labor service.27 The Korner decree held out the possibility of
exemption from labor service in very specific cases. These included:
• pregnant or nursing women who were solely responsible for running their households, as long as
they had at least one child younger than ten years;
• politically or racially persecuted concentration camp inmates, as well as their mothers and wives,
provided that they had never belonged to the groups identified in §4 and §12;
• clergymen, nuns, doctors, dentists, midwives, and civil servants (white or blue collar);
• people with war-related injuries (from either 1914-18 or 1939-45) belonging to the highest three
classifications of disability.28

Posters affixed to kiosks throughout the city announced the terms of Notstandsarbeit;
administrative officials in each district were responsible for conveying this information to
residents, either by entrusting local political party organizations with further
dissemination or requesting that superintendents in privately and municipally owned
apartment buildings post the decree conspicuously. In preparation for the introduction of
Notstandsarbeit, local officials compiled house lists for the Landesarbeitsamt and district
police stations that included all pertinent data for every adult resident at each address.29
Municipal authorities in each district then posted a complete list of those required to enter
into labor service as well as the duration of individual work commitments at a series of
registration stations (Meldestellen). Responsibility lay with Viennese residents to check
the list at their local Meldestelle to determine if they owed labor service.
Participants' responses to the Notstandsarbeit varied. On the whole, there are no
indications that the majority of those affected sought to avoid September work details,
however. Indeed, this may have been related in large measure to the linkage of ration
card distribution with fulfillment of labor service; few could have afforded to exist from
black market activity at a comfortable level for any sustained period. Moreover, fear of
arrest for noncompliance, socialization to respect existing authorities, or a genuine desire
to somehow "make good" to Austrian society for having played a role-however small-in
the Nazi system may also have contributed to compliance. All the same, it would seem
that many people required to work did not do so with great effectiveness or
overwhelming zeal. This appears to have been the result of several factors. A severe
shortage of backhoes and trucks to assist in loading and removing rubble and limited fuel
to power them hampered efforts; a modest number of wagons, drawn by invariably lean
and hungry horses, did little to make up for the shortage of mechanized support. Indeed,
as one district police commissioner observed: "[W]ithout the support of Russian
occupation authorities, where possible, the rubble removal effort would be condemned to
total failure."30 Also factoring into the rather limited productivity for the September
Arbeitseinsatz was the absence of productivity quotas-that is, a specific number of cubic

meters of rubble to be moved per hour, contingent upon age or gender. Any such mandate
would have smacked of the kind of authoritarianism that officials were determined to
avoid at all costs. Moreover, among the Viennese soldiers held in Allied prisoner of war
camps and unavailable for Notstandsarbeit were hundreds, if not thousands, of young and
reasonably able-bodied men who would have qualified on the basis of unemployment or
according to §4 or §12 of the Verbotsgesetz. Even if ample labor power could have been
drawn upon, the average Viennese lacked the physical energy to work productively on a
sustained basis; many people suffered from malnutrition and its associated maladies, as
well as from debilitating illnesses such as tuberculosis.31 Average ration cards allowed
for approximately 1,200 calories per day through the summer and early autumn-hardly a
diet that allowed for sustained heavy physical exertion, even if one could supplement
one's nutritional intake with foodstuffs from private gardens or illegal trade, or secure the
modest 420 calorie supplement for engaging in demanding, reconstruction-oriented
labor.32 Finally, just five months after the war's end, the municipal bureaucracy had yet
to achieve a consistently high level of administrative efficiency due to personnel shortages linked to the large-scale dismissal of Nazis. Further impeding efficiency was the
occasional political backlash and administrative instability related to the reinstatement
and redismissal of a number of "lesser Nazis" (die Minderbelasteten)-that is, those whose
status as Parteimitglieder or Parteianwürter did not place them under the restrictive
clauses of the Verbotsgesetz.33
Some un- or underemployed Viennese embraced Notstandsarbeit, however. Such
individuals-often self-identified as Social Democrats, but not exclusively so34 -considered
it a vital expression of civic pride. For them labor service represented an opportunity to
contribute to the restoration of the city's luster and its functioning infrastructure. Far more
frequently, however, the archival record reveals cases of individual Viennese pleading
extenuating circumstances to gain exemption from the September Arbeitseinsatz.
Whether or not Viennese citizens had become National Socialists, the manner in
which they addressed the mayor as supplicants offers insight into everyday concerns,
both material and health-related, during the immediate postwar period, as well as their
justifications for either participating in or distancing themselves from the Nazi system. In
one instance, a young woman of twenty-five protested that she was assigned one hundred
and twenty hours of labor service-the maximum under Korner's decree. Friederike’s
sixty-two-year-old father, a World War I veteran with 50 percent disability from an
unspecified service-related lung ailment, had allegedly been enrolled automatically in the
ranks of the NSDAP in 1941 because of his work with the NS War Victims' Association.
He claimed never to have been politically active. Because Korner's edict specified that
those who could not work would have to provide an able-bodied family member who had
behaved openly as a Nazi ("die sich offenkundig betatigt haben") in their place, Frau S.,
who insisted that she had neither been a Parteimitglied nor politically active in any way,
was nonetheless ordered to fulfill her father's labor obligation. Her plea to Korner
emphasized that her ‘existence would be seriously endangered if [she] had to complete
the 120 hours in one month;' for S. needed all her time to work two jobs to support her
father and herself. This case found its way to the mayor's office (Bürgermeisteramt) for
review, where experts deemed that municipal officials would have acted in contradiction
to the law if the woman had, indeed, never been affiliated with the NSDAP or behaved in
a fashion that supported the regime. Subsequent consultation between municipal

authorities and the responsible district administrator (Herr Hajek of Wien-Rudolfsheim)
resulted in the cancellation of Frau S’s service requirement.35
If individual Viennese under the imperial, interwar republican, Fatherland Front, or
Nazi regimes had understood that authority carried with it the responsibility to care for
‘decent, lawabiding citizens;' the new municipal government also recognized the
importance of administering the city on behalf of citizens in a fashion consistent with a
new, democratic-republican Rechtsstaat. A particularly telling case is that of the
Arbeitseinsatz in the district Wien-Leopoldstadt. In October 1945, representatives of the
Association of Construction Firms notified the Landesarbeitsamt that district officials in
Leopoldstadt had compelled private construction workers to log more than the thirty-two
hours required of most engaged in the Arbeitseinsatz. Many had been forced to work as
many as one hundred and fifty hours during September-a violation of the law and of their
rights-with repercussions for the firms at which these people were employed. As a result,
the association's representatives requested that the Landesarbeitsamt inform the police
inspector responsible for monitoring the Arbeitseinsatz in Leopoldstadt of rampant
violations. Korner's office received notification, and the situation was monitored from
that point forward.36 Because of the extensive damage in Leopoldstadt, it appears to have
been an “unwritten rule" among district officials that more labor would be exacted from
their residents than stipulated in Korner's decree.37
Another striking example of the city government's commitment to the letter of the
law on behalf of citizens is that of a graphic artist, Frau Hedwig S. from WienAlsergrund, a non-Nazi who found her name listed at her local Meldestelle on 21
September. She reported the next day and promptly asked for a medical examination
from municipal health officials. Frau S. claimed to have experienced a middle ear
operation, a kidney infection, removal of her tonsils, and scarlet fever over the previous
several months; as a result of these maladies she had suffered anemia, exhaustion, and
fainting spells. Herr R., the official on duty at the Meldestelle, replied that he could see to
it that she had an easy desk job in the office, "for he already knew what sort of expert
opinion the public health administration doctor would issue."38 Frau S. began working at
the Meldestelle, but reported that in the process of organizing the labor exemption forms
of Nazis and non-Nazis in the district, she noticed a physician's finding that "even
National Socialists were excused from their labor duty because they were nineteen or
twenty kilos below their normal weight (my weight was the same, actually twenty-one
kilos below normal) without other mitigating health issues."39 Frau S. brought this
information to the attention of Herr R., insisting that she too wished to avail herself of an
official health examination. He responded with a torrent of threats and personal insultsincluding the remark that Frau S’s profession was "worthless"-and referred her to a
female doctor with the observation that he was "sending along a woman who didn't want
to work:' Without bothering to examine her, the physician concluded that she was fit
enough to fulfill her sixteen-hour requirement with light work. Frau S. drew a parallel
between methods employed under the Third Reich and her own recent treatment:
"Yesterday I experienced that there are elements within the public service of Austrian
democracy who seem determined to outstrip [officials in] the earlier National Socialist
labor offices and public health positions. Formerly one was declared an enemy of the
state if one raised objections. I live as a free, unsullied citizen in a democratic state. Must
I accept genuinely terroristic and personally insulting treatment because I dared politely

and matter-of-factly to insist upon the exercise of my legal right that is afforded to
citizens who are subject to punishment [under the Verbotsgesetz]?" In the end, Frau S.
decided that she would complete her sixteen hours of labor service rather than risk the
loss of her ration cards, but she remarked bitterly that "this sort of allocation of labor
power cannot be in the interest of the Austrian political leadership:' 40 She received an
invitation to visit the Magistratsdirektion to discuss the case. However, those who fell
under the Verbotsgesetz and were unable to present extraordinary extenuating
circumstances or confirm alleged ill health would find the Rathaus doors closed to
them.41
Between April and November 1945, officials employed in various capacities at the
district level were overwhelmingly Social Democrats or Communists who had been
harassed or otherwise victimized at the hands of National Socialist security officials.
Given their antifascist credentials, municipal and district authorities considered them the
most politically reliable people to replace former Nazis in positions of responsibility.
Perhaps not surprisingly, in a number of cases these individuals violated legal principles
in their zeal to accelerate the tempo of early reconstruction work and, where possible, to
visit a form of retribution on National Socialists, their sympathizers, or those whom they
perceived to be malingerers. This clashed with the efforts of municipal officials at the
highest levels to champion the basic human dignity and legal rights of all citizens,
including former Nazis. Although these individuals generally worked conscientiously
within the framework of denazification legislation, they were also prepared to handle
former Nazis pragmatically where conducive to promoting efficient administration.
Where such decisions became known, they met with criticism from vocal antifascists in
the district administrations and members of the citizenry, however. A particularly
revealing example is that of Herr K., a Social Democrat from Wien-Penzing. Herr K.
wrote to Mayor Korner as a concerned party comrade that "the Arbeitseinsatzleiter in the
fourteenth district is a registered Nazi named Z. As a Socialist who has belonged to the
party for decades, I find it disgraceful that a leading position in our Red Vienna can be
given to a Nazi, against whom neither dismissal nor complaint is possible."42 An
investigation led the Magistratsdirektor to conclude that "Z. was never with the NSDAP,
rather a contributing member to one of its organizations for only a short time. Thus he is
not required to register on the denazification list.... The Landesarbeitsamt has taken into
consideration Z.'s excellent work and therefore there is no occasion to remove him from
his post:'43
In another case, an agricultural specialist in the municipal administration, Herr
Diplomingenieur Emmerich F. was considered so valuable for coordination of the harvest
in Vienna's outlying districts that he was permitted to defer his mandatory labor service
for three months, even though he was known as a former NSDAP member in his home
district ofWien-Floridsdorf.44 His work requirement would have arguably been far more
physically taxing if performed when originally scheduled; after several weeks of
concentrated Arbeitseinsatz, large reconstruction projects would have often been
followed by less arduous follow-up tasks, to the benefit of individuals such as Herr F.
who enjoyed deferments.
The case of Adolfine G. offers a final illustration of municipal commitment to the
letter of the law, this time to the benefit of a person who had been a notorious Nazi and
had earned the enmity of her antifascist neighbors. Although obliged to perform

September labor service, Frau G. sent her young apprentices to fulfill her labor shifts,
which involved particularly strenuous rubble removal. The KP newspaper Die
Osterreichiche Volksstimme broke the story in its 11 October edition. Frau G. claimed
that the apprentices, Fraulein T. and Fraulein H., had been willing to do the work, and
Frau G. did not want to be absent from her business during an anticipated inspection. The
district administrator for Wien-Ottakring initiated an investigation that resulted in a
recommendation for disciplinary action-the Frau G. case had created bad blood within the
district. However, the Magistratsdirektion noted that as vexing as Frau G.'s behavior was,
it "did not, indeed, involve a punishable set of circumstances" under the terms of Korner's
proclamation; officials at the various Meldestellen for labor service would have to be
more vigilant in the future.45
Bureaucratic confusion and the behavior of overzealous antifascists
notwithstanding, Arbeitseinsatz did not bear any similarity to methods employed under
the Third Reich. Both former Nazis caught up in punitive denazification measures and
"untainted" Viennese affected by the compulsory features of reconstruction could appeal
to the Rathaus to preserve legality against arbitrariness and could generally expect
redress. To be sure, what the archival record cannot reveal is the extent to which
individual supplicants treated unfairly by bureaucrats were too intimidated or fatalistic to
register complaints with the Burgermeisteramt or with the Magistratsdirektion. On the
other hand, if critics within the Viennese bureaucracy-or the broader population-felt
confused by or dissatisfied with decisions taken in the Rathaus, they were hard pressed to
make the case that the administration treated former Nazis or shirkers with anything
resembling nonchalant leniency.
Mandating Labor Service: Toward the 1946 Arbeitspflichtgesetz
Given the above considerations, Korner's September Aufruf proved insufficient to
catalyze a profound or an immediate improvement in the physical condition of the city.
Moreover, by its very nature it was not designed to stimulate a sustained reconstruction
effort; despite the continuation of some labor service commitments into October, the
campaign was limited to no more than 120 and as little as 16 hours within a four-week
span. After the 25 November 1945 elections had installed representative democratic
governments at the Bund, Land, and Gemeinde levels, the occupation authorities-at least
the Western Allies-felt that they could demand cooperation from democratically
sanctioned officials to mediate between the Austrian population and the victorious
powers in matters of post-conflict reconstruction. It was in this spirit that American
Brigadier General T. E. Lewis, chief commander of the US Section of the Vienna InterAllied Command (VIAC) demanded of Mayor Korner that he "report the reason why
adequate labor is not being employed and what means you have put into effect or
contemplate putting into effect immediately in order to secure adequate labor."46
Korner's reply stressed a lack of available labor power due to the fact that between
150,000 and 200,000 Wiener "from the age groups most capable of work" remained in
Allied POW camps. This meant that "women, old people, and youths" formed the largest
part of the population capable of taking up short-term labor service. Korner concluded
that ultimately "it does not lie within my power to interpose any kind of decree. The
federal government alone-and in my opinion, only with support from the Allies,

moreover-is capable of taking measures to remedy this situation:'47 1t was abundantly
clear to Austrian officials and the Allied authorities that prisoners of war could not be
repatriated rapidly enough to address pressing reconstruction needs. A rather substantial
pool of labor did exist if one took into account the very people whom Korner had enlisted
for the September Arbeitseinsatz-primarily former National Socialists on the one hand,
and the unemployed, underemployed, or nonessentially employed on the other. In short,
the pressing need for labor power remained fundamentally linked to the still-unresolved
matter of denazification, the enlistment of Arbeitsscheue and black marketers, and the
cultivation of self-sacrifice in the interest of an anticipated democratic civic culture.
Austrian government officials and particularly OVP and SPO representatives were
hopeful that federal Arbeitspflicht legislation would play a vital role in stimulating the
country's postwar recovery. Mandatory labor appeared all the more important, given the
significant number of soldiers killed, injured, or held as POWs. Further, an internal
dislocation of the labor force had occurred as people fled the Red Army for the perceived
safety of western Austria, and the emergence of the black market during the initial
postwar months presented a challenge to initial recovery. These factors placed a premium
on effective recruitment and allocation of reconstruction labor. Yet the
Arbeitspflichtgesetz ratified on 15 February 1946 should be understood as more than a
matter of labor recruitment in and of itself; it also represented a component of an ongoing
denazification process. Indeed, those targeted in the first instance were ex-Nazis, as
defined in the draft Nationalsozialistengesetz that followed from the 1945 Verbotsgesetz.
Those targeted by the draft law had been SS members, storm troopers, Nazi functionaries,
or deco- rated NSDAP members, or had committed war crimes-even if they became party
members after the Anschluss. (Such individuals had been designated "implicated"
[belastet], as noted above.) In addition to losing their political rights until at least 30
April 1950-a period later reduced-those in the belastet category were barred from
working in the civil service or holding certain professional positions as lawyers,
accountants, or financial advisors, enjoying leading positions in public or private
economic enterprises, teaching, serving in the police or security services, or working in
the entertainment industry.48 The version of the Nationalsozialistengesetz ratified and
approved by the Allies identified Belastete for compulsory labor service under the
concurrently drafted Arbeitspflichtgesetz.49
Individuals designated "less implicated" (minderbelastet) found themselves
subjected to substantial fines rather than imprisonment, deprived of political rights, and
faced with the employment limitations suffered by Belastete until 30 April 1948.50 These
were people who had become "ordinary" Nazi Party members or were awaiting
confirmation of membership between Austria's absorption into Germany on 13 March
1938 and the end of the war, did not belong to any organizations deemed criminal, and
had not committed crimes against humanity or public order. It is significant that
Minderbelastete were not specifically targeted for compulsory work assignments, yet
along with black marketers and labor shirkers they were not exempted from labor
deployment and could be enlisted where local authorities deemed it necessary. Special
commissions composed of representatives from all three antifascist parties reviewed the
registration forms submitted by all former Nazis and assigned them "implicated" or "lessimplicated" status on the basis of the data provided. Such information required
corroboration through personal references-whose trustworthiness could be subjected to

further scrutiny- and in the last resort the relevant zonal occupation authority reserved the
right to make any final determination concerning an individual's designation. Ultimately,
some 440,000 former Nazis were designated minderbelastet. According to revisions in
the Nationalsozialistengesetz introduced in February 1947, the above-mentioned
prohibitions against their employment were relaxed significantly, although not done away
with altogether.51
As noted, the draft Arbeitspflichtgesetz developed in February 1946, which enjoyed
support from the OVP-SPO coalition, was linked closely to denazification legislation. In
fact, Ehemalige were the primary group identified by the Arbeitspflichtgesetz. The
second paragraph of §1 stipulated that men between the ages of sixteen and sixty and
women between sixteen and fifty who had registered as Nazis according to the 8 May
1945 Verbotsgesetz were required to per- form labor service.52 This provision was more
severe than the original compulsory labor clause in the Verbotsgesetz; the latter had
called only for employment of those who would later be designated as belastetet in urgent
work (so-called sofort Arbeit). This form of labor was intrinsically physical-that is, the
removal of war-related rubble from streets, waterways, and bombed- out housing or
production sites-and the strenuous nature of the work derived, in part, from punitive
considerations. However, as SPO parliamentary deputy Wilhemine Moik observed,
compulsory labor as envisioned in the new Arbeitspflichtgesetz did not stem from a
desire for revenge or feelings of hatred toward ex-Nazis. Rather, she emphasized that it
"is probably the mildest form of expiation:' 53 The Arbeitspflichtgesetz did not designate
that their labor should be more onerous than those who were merely unemployed or
engaged in "non-essential" labor. Individual firms or government bureaucracies entrusted
with reconstruction projects would submit work-detail requests to the relevant
Landesarbeitsamt,54 and individuals subject to labor service would be assigned to one
the following project sectors, listed below in the prioritized rank order outlined in the
legislation:
a) emergency work required by occupation authorities;
b) agricultural production and transport of foodstuffs, emergency repairs of enterprises connected to
the foodstuffs industry and foodstuffs distribution network;
c) demolition of buildings beyond repair and in danger of collapse; manufacture of building
materials and machine tools for reconstruction; emergency repairs on apartments and buildings
designated as most pressing by communal authorities;
d) emergency repairs on sanitation facilities, sewer lines, and water pipes;
e) energy production (e.g., electricity, coal mining) and distribution;
f) emergency repairs on roadways, public transportation lines, and railroad tracks; g) emergency
work to stem the danger of flooding. 55

Austrian politicians, particularly Social Democrats, stressed that Arbeitspflicht legislation
would assume none of the draconian and dehumanizing features of National Socialist
Zwangsarbeit.56 Rather, similar to the September 1945 Arbeitseinsatz in Vienna, former
Nazis would enjoy the very same social protections under the law as anyone else
employed in labor service. For example, a medical examination, conducted by doctors
provided by the local Landesarbeitsamt, would determine if individuals were robust
enough to fulfill their six-month compulsory labor service commitments.57 Social
welfare considerations would not discriminate against those engaged in Arbeitspjlicht
either, regardless of their previous political or employment status. For instance, health

insurance would be provided to all laborers employed under the Arbeitspflichtgesetz;
they would also be compensated at the same wage level as those working in these sectors
without Arbeitspflicht, and a one-time round-trip travel allowance would assist those
required to leave their home regions for their designated labor sites.58 Foreigners were
exempt from compulsory labor, insofar as they did not have permanent residence in
Austria (a particular benefit for DPs), and victims of National Socialism-a broad group
including the politically, religiously, and "racially" persecuted-remained free from labor
service assignments.
Although the Arbeitspflichtgesetz did not formally enter into effect until 25 July
1946 (BGBL Nr. 36), Austrian authorities began the recruitment and deployment of labor
during the weeks preceding its introduction. Between 1 May and 31 July 1946 the
Landesarbeitsümter reviewed 413,748 registration forms and earmarked a total of 3,198
individuals for compulsory labor assignment with private firms requesting assistance.
The majority of these assignments occurred in Styria-a total of 1,798 or 56.2 percent of
all of those reported; Tirol followed with 508 deployments (15.9 percent), and Carinthia
with 415 (13 percent).59 No comparable comprehensive data elucidate the number of
individuals employed directly by the public sector across Austria.
Vienna's Landesarbeitsamt did not report any requests for labor from private
enterprises; Gemeinde authorities noted that Viennese firms doubted that those obliged to
work would do so with sufficient enthusiasm and were therefore reluctant to accept labor
deployment without the firms' representatives having a say in allocation. On the other
hand, ample evidence suggests that municipally directed reconstruction projects did not
hesitate to employ by hook or by crook individuals-Nazis or others-who fell under the
terms of Arbeitspflicht legislation. Reports from the Wiener Polizeidirektion detail raids
by police and occupation troops on coffee houses, clubs, and public gathering spots
during daylight working hours that led to the detention of hundreds of black marketers
and other questionable characters. Many of those taken into custody subsequently found
themselves assigned to clean up war-damaged sections of the city.60
Protests, entreaties, and stalling maneuvers from those who wished to avoid
municipal labor service projects met with little sympathy from city authorities. Two very
different examples help illustrate this point. Josef H., a former Social Democrat and
Schutzbundler who fled Vienna for Brno after the February 1934 civil war, received
notification that he was to resume working for the Bundesbahn in Vienna-but in a menial
capacity, rather than in his earlier role as a locomotive conductor. His demotion resulted
from his previous affiliation with the NSDAP. Herr H. had returned to Austria and joined
the SA, dating his membership from 1937-which earned him Illegale status under the
Verbotsgesetz-in order to end a seven-year spell of joblessness and secure a position with
the Deutsche Reichsbahn in Vienna. He claimed never to have worn the SA uniform or
sported the swastika as a lapel pin or armband. Forced to register as a Nazi in his home
district of Wien-Brigittenau, Herr H. appealed to the Bürgermeister that he was being
persecuted as a Nazi, although he insisted his sentiments had always remained firmly
Social Democratic. Rather than take up labor service below his self-perceived
professional and living standards, Herr H. made clear in his appeal that he was prepared
to continue living from his savings and wait for his reinstatement if cancellation of his
assigned labor service hours proved impossible.61 The tone of Herr H.'s letter registers
bewilderment and despair, as well as an inability to comprehend how his opportunistic

choice to seek NSDAP affiliation-and during the time of illegality, no less-could have
landed him in difficulties. Without corroborating evidence, it is impossible to determine
if he backdated his SA membership to 1937 in order to gain employment after the
Anschluss-or, for that matter, if he had in fact held himself at a distance from the Nazi
Party between 1938 and 1945. The director of the Bürgermeisteramt replied: "[I)nquiries
revealed that you 'have lived from savings' since 8 August 1945 and have not undertaken
to enter into any work whatsoever, although it has been offered to you many times over.
As long as you are not willing to contribute actively to the reconstruction of Vienna and
of Austria, you can hardly expect to find a promotion [to your earlier position with the
railway]. You, a thirty-two-year-old man, should be a willing model of keen activity to
our over- worked Bürgermeister, instead of burdening him with concerns that you could
address through your own energy."62 Herr H.'s case offers an example of how reluctant
municipal authorities were to indulge individuals who sought either to shirk their
responsibility to make good their political errors, or who sought to secure shortcuts to
better paying and less arduous work.
Measures taken against Hans M., the owner of a transport firm who rejected
municipal directives to make a truck available for labor service, provide another
perspective on shirkers. Herr M. not only refused to comply with the city's order, but
according to witnesses he heaped abuses upon officials from Magistratsabteilung 47
(Transportlenkung) who had come to his garage for the vehicle. From the date of the
initial order on 21 June 1946 until17 July 1946, Herr M. refused to release the truck. He
was charged with insulting public officials and aggressive behavior and summoned to
court and to the district administrative office in Wien-Ottakring.63 While the basis for
Herr M.'s obstructionism and anger cannot be discerned from the documentation, one
might speculate that he intended to use the vehicle for black market purposes
that would have yielded more than the standard rate applicable under the
Arbeitspflichtgesetz; otherwise there would have been little reason for his
noncompliance. Involvement in black market activity could not be proved on the basis of
available evidence, and the authorities limited charges against Herr M. to
Amtsehrenbeleidigung and obstruction of the law.
Allocation of all available hands and every piece of working equipment to labor
service became still more pressing as improved weather from spring through summer
1946 permitted intensified efforts. However, as the following example from August 1946
demonstrates, work did not always proceed as smoothly as good weather might have
allowed. In Wien-Hietzing, groups of twenty and thirty-nine former Nazis turned out for
their designated labor assignments on Saturday, 11 August, and Sunday, 12 August,
respectively. On Saturday morning, only three cubic meters of debris were removed
because the individual responsible for organizing the trucks and drivers clocked out at
12:30 with the explanation that Saturdays only counted as half-days; in addition, only two
of the promised three trucks had materialized. Nonetheless, the Ehemaligen received their
full daily wage from the Gemeinde, with the understanding that it had not been their
responsibility that work could not continue. On Sunday morning, the larger contingent
arrived at the staging point by 7:00, but none of the trucks or employees of the trucking
firm appeared; at 9:30, the district official responsible for overseeing the Arbeitseinsatz
concluded that he had no choice but to send the laborers home, this time without
compensation.64 In response to a formal complaint from Wien-Hietzing Bezirksvorsteher

Josef Cudlin (OVP), the Stadtbaudirektor replied that Magistratsabteilung 25, the
department responsible for addressing war-related damage to municipal buildings, was
regrettably not in the position to compel either firms providing drivers and trucks or the
Allies, who frequently pledged to loan vehicles, to make good on their promisesparticularly in the frequent case of gasoline shortages.65 Similar incidents reported by
district representatives and district branches of central municipal offices prompted the
city manager, Magistratsdirektor Dr. Kritscha, to issue a directive to all district
authorities and relevant city departments that Magistratsabteilung 25 could not function
as a guarantor of transportation. Officials in the districts would remain responsible for
arranging and verifying arrangements with firms or occupation authorities providing
drivers or vehicles.66 Coordination of labor, vehicles, fuel, and food for workers
determined the success of Arbeitseinsütze throughout the city, and the proper balance
could never be assured.
Vienna's director of urban planning and reconstruction estimated that, as of April
1946, almost 700,000 of what had originally been nearly 800,000 cubic meters of debris
still cluttered streets and public squares and that another 2.5 million lay in bombed-out
houses, factories, warehouses, and public buildings.67 Falling material from damaged
buildings remained a constant danger, capable of injuring or killing pedestrians and
blocking traffic.68 Detailed weekly reports made it plain that two factors were vital for
an effective campaign to remove the detritus of war from Vienna's urban space: a
consistent supply of sufficiently motivated workers and the availability of trucks or
horse-drawn wagons capable of traveling on streetcar lines to assist in rubble
clearance.69 Difficulties in transportation-alleviated considerably when British,
American, and French forces began to supply trucks, bulldozers, and backhoes in larger
numbers as of spring 1946-trying working conditions, the absence of facilities to provide
workers with on-site meals, and highly demanding physical tasks coupled with low
caloric intake also acted as impediments to uniform and consistently successful
implementation of Arbeitspflicht, both before and after the formal introduction of the law.
According to figures issued by the Austrian government, the Arbeitsümter recorded
a far greater demand for workers (again, initially weighted toward the western Lander
and Styria) than the available labor pool proved able to sustain.70 This placed a greater
premium on employing former National Socialists in rubble clearance, as well as in snow
removal during the bitter winter of 1946/47, as had been the case in 1945/46.71 In certain
cases Ehemalige chose suicide as an alternative to losing their professional status or the
shame of what they considered forced labor.72 While this choice was far from the norm,
it conveys a sense of the marginalization perceived by those held to be unrepentant Nazis
and effectively confirmed the suspicions of those who doubted that they could ever be
redeemed. More frequently, as illustrated by the representative examples provided above,
Ehemalige and others obliged to work issued pleas or offered excuses in their efforts to
escape labor service.
Assessing the Efficacy of Arbeitspflicht in the Broader Austrian Context
Arguably, Arbeitspflicht was more effective in the public sector than in the private;
we have already noted that municipal, provincial, and federal agencies were less
concerned about the work ethic of those subject to labor service than were private firms.

In the public sector, wages could be kept manageably low because the largely unskilled
labor of rubble removal and clean-up did not require high rates of compensation. Yet
historian Dieter Stiefel underscores the strains created by the "artificial unemployment"
that resulted in no small measure from the prevention of almost 500,000 former Nazis,
many of them professionals, from employment in their fields of specialization during the
first two years of the Second Republic. When modifications to denazification legislation
permitted most Ehemalige to return to work in 1947, Stiefel observes, "reconstructioni.e., the re-establishment of the socio-economic basis of a modern industrial society ...
one of the fundamental conditions for the reestablishment of the Republic of Austriastood in a conflict of interest vis-a-vis political purification."73 It would appear that the
latter was sacrificed to the exigencies of the former.
On balance, then, how can we evaluate the success of Arbeitspflicht throughout
Austria and particularly in Vienna? From a Social Democratic perspective, although the
employment of former National Socialists was formally consistent with "re-education
through expiation" rather than blanket punishment,74 the broader, ostensibly civic
educational element of Arbeitspflicht was never manifest in the letter of the law or in its
application.75 On the whole, the Austrian population greeted compulsory labor service
unenthusiastically. The Landesarbeitsamt in Tirol reported that, in some districts, police
consistently had to round up those who attempted to evade their work responsibilities.76
According to reports from Vorarlberg, Upper Austria, Lower Austria, and Styria, similar
difficulties prevented the smooth implementation of the law, and those who did show up
for labor service rarely displayed particular enthusiasm for their assignments.77 To ensure
that the population was gainfully employed, the federal government required citizens to
display their labor certification IDs in order to acquire food ration cards-a practice
already employed in Vienna in the summer and autumn of 1945. Those obliged to fulfill
labor service received their official cards if they registered at the Meldestelle and
appeared at their designated labor sites. However, industrious individuals responded with
a new industry in counterfeit records designed to verify full-time employment status, and
black market foodstuffs remained available for those willing to pay or trade.78 Moreover,
the punitive effect that legislators intended the law to have on Ehemalige seemed lost in
practice, at least in the less war-damaged western and southern provinces, where demand
for unskilled physical labor proved less overwhelming (with a few notable exceptions,
such as in parts of the industrial city of Linz). In these areas, fewer Ehemalige found
themselves pressed into what would have been humiliating manual labor-a consideration
worth taking into account, since many Nazis had benefited from better job placement
during the 1l1ird Reich and tended to dominate the middle to higher salary levels
associated with the free professions, engineering, and management. This made them more
expensive for private firms that might have required their services; the public sector in
these parts of Austria, which would have been able to pay them the standard rate for
unskilled heavy labor, had less of a need for them.79 Vienna remained an exception,
where the public sector absorbed the lion's share of those subject to Arbeitspflüht- the
majority of them former National Socialists-for rubble removal and seasonal work such
as snow clearance.
Despite the law's widespread lack of popularity, Landesarbeitsümter reports of
noncompliance, continued objections from the Federal Chamber of Labor
(Arbeiterkammer), increasingly tepid support from much of the SPO parliamentary

faction, and outright KPO opposition, the Austrian parliament voted an extension of
compulsory labor service for the calendar year 1947 and again for 1948.80 While one of
the alleged purposes of extending the provisions of the law was to compel more
systematically former National Socialists to work for the benefit of the fledgling republic,
the text of the law was revised to correspond to categories of culpability delineated in the
1947 denazification law.81 Thus, Minderbelastete were no longer singled out for harsher
treatment than those recruited citizens who had not gone over to the Nazis, and the only
special provision for the Belasteten was the preservation of the upper age limits for those
liable to fulfill labor service.82 When the Amnestiegesetz of 21 April 1948 removed the
legal restrictions against 487,067 Minderbelastete, reeducation through "labor-penance"
became even less meaningful.83
Nonetheless, the decision not to renew the Arbeitspflichtgesetz at the end of 1948
ultimately had rather little to do with the law's reception among the population, the
shortcomings identified by the provincial labor authorities, or the judgment that
Ehemalige and work-shirkers had been rehabilitated. Once the Amnestiegesetz entered
into effect, the OVP and SPO entered into competition for former Minderbelastete, now
qualified to vote in the 1949 elections. Additionally, a massive influx of foreign
assistance and increased engagement on the part of Austrian citizens eclipsed
Arbeitspflicht as an engine in the areas of agricultural labor and rubble removal or
construction projects in towns and cities. While United Nations relief aid had helped to
alleviate much of the country's short-term need for foodstuffs between April1946 and
June 1947,84 the majority of debris had been removed by 1948, utilities had been
restored, and with the introduction of wide-ranging longer-term assistance provided by
the Marshall Plan-including machinery to expedite the final stages of clean-up and early
reconstruction activity initially completed with human hands-rebuilding could proceed at
a more rapid pace.85
Calculated in raw dollar totals, direct aid through the Marshall Plan reached
approximately $417.4 million between 1948 and 1950 and another $232.4 million in
credits between 1948 and 1951.86 Further increases in foodstuff delivery, fertilizers,
vehicles, fuel for transportation and production, and material to repair or build rail lines
and roads represented essential elements for initial economic recovery. In the end,
increased rationalization and mechanization of Austria's transport, agricultural, and
industrial sectors eliminated the need for sizable emergency labor resources designated to
each of these areas. This massive infusion of foreign, largely Marshall Plan, aid that
began to prime the pump for economic reconstruction during the late1940s and early
1950s, together with the majority of the Austrian population's willingness to work to
achieve material comfort, became key contributing factors for Austria's reconstruction
and eventual recovery.
Both Social Democratic and Catholic-conservative political leaders were united in
their conviction that economic prosperity represented the surest defense against resurgent
extremism on the part of those who had supported far-left or far-right political parties.
When considered in this light, integration of all but the most seriously implicated
Austrian Nazis appeared decisive if Austrian society was to achieve, and sustain, material
comfort and social peace.87 Steadfast OVP and SPO anticommunism facilitated smooth
Austrian entry into the European Recovery Program (ERP) recipient network, where
economic aid served the twin goals of creating social and political stability.88 However,

most ERP counterpart funds were not directed to Vienna, and in the capital this served as
something of a brake on initial reconstruction and recovery in comparative terms.
Historian Günter Bischof notes that "[t]he westward movement of lead sectors in the
Austrian economy (especially war-related heavy industry) already started during the war
and accelerated after the war-... would come to characterize the postwar Austrian
economy. Next to Nazi investments in western Austria, Marshall funds were the crucial
engine for Westverschiebung. Fully 81 percent of the ERP funds were invested in the
Western zones, only 19 percent in the Soviet zone and Vienna."89
Not surprisingly, by the early 1950s the Western Allies began to take on the role of
agents for recovery and guarantors against Red Army expansion outside of the Soviet
zone of control. Concurrently, Austrians saw ERP assistance as central to recovery and
regarded physical reconstruction, economic growth, and the maintenance of social peace
as the surest ways to buttress the young Second Republic. The beneficial effects of hard
work, access to adequate supplies of consumer goods, the promise of a secure social
welfare net, and good standing in the international community represented for them a
more palatable means for transforming Austria than did denazification measures and
compulsory labor service. Indeed, for many Austrians who identified with the designation
"first victims of Nazi aggression" in the Allies' Moscow Declaration (1943), occupation,
denazification, and labor service raised irreconcilable tensions inherent to the Austrian
victim/perpetrator dyad.
Evaluating Arbeitspflicht in Vienna as a Component of Reconstruction
While the social, economic, and geopolitical considerations discussed above clearly
influenced perceptions of Arbeitspflicht among politicians, administrators, and ordinary
Austrians, there can be little doubt that labor service facilitated initial reconstruction
efforts. This was particularly true in Vienna, where the greatest concentration of warrelated destruction had been inflicted.90 Although legally mandated labor service
remained in effect until the end of 1948, evidence compiled by municipal authorities
suggests that considerable progress occurred between September 1945 and July 1946-that
is, prior to the introduction of federal labor service legislation. Indeed, the progress made
under the auspices of Korner's decree during the nine months prior to the introduction of
the Arbeitspflichtgesetz cannot be underestimated. For example, from late August to late
December 1945, a total of 157,908 of a calculated 794,973 cubic meters of rubble that
had cluttered Vienna's streets, squares, and other surfaces had been hauled away by hand
and by human- or horse-drawn wagons. At this point, Austrian-owned or Allied vehicles
were only rarely available for assistance.91
Broad assessment of municipally directed Arbeitseinsatze can be made on the basis
of status reports surviving from the better part of 1946 that describe efforts both before
and after the for- mal introduction of the Arbeitspflichtgesetz. From early April to mid
November 1946, weekly reports prepared by the Stadtbauamt for the Bürgermeister and
his Magistratsdirektor listed the number of workers employed and the amount of debris
removed in cubic meters, as well as the number of railroad cars, streetcars, trucks, and
backhoes available. Over the thirty-one weeks for which complete data exist, some
26,539 labor deployments are registered-an aggregate figure that does not take into
account the number of assignments per worker during a given week, or the number of

weeks that the average person engaged in labor service. A daily average of 856 people
entered into working relationships, but during certain periods-early in the sequence of
weekly reports and prior to the formal introduction of the Arbeitspflichtgesetz in July-as
few as 272 laborers appeared for work during the week ending on 10 April, as opposed to
a high mark of 1,180 for the week ending on 15 September.92 Between 1 January and 14
November 1946, these laborers removed an additional 556,899 cubic meters of debris
that littered the city.93 Unfortunately, available archival sources do not offer a systematic
representation of the precise subcategories of those obliged to work-that is, Ehemalige,
prisoners (black marketers, thieves, etc.), shirkers, and "untainted" individuals diverted
from other sectors. Rather, one must remain satisfied with the insights gained into the
composition of the labor force engaged in municipal projects at given moments during
1946, 1947, and 1948. For example, in the first half of August 1946, of the 1,032
individuals engaged in debris removal, 555 counted as Gemeinde- employed laborers
(stündige Arbeiter), 159 as convicts (Strafgefangene), and 318 as National Socialists.94
This still represented a rather high proportion of Ehemalige to city workers. The total
declined into 1947, and ex-Nazis became only marginally significant as part of the city's
reconstruction labor force from late 1947 through the end of 1948.
Several factors seem to have accounted for this trend. By late 1946, the
Magistratsdirektion reported that intensive repairs to the city's gas and water lines,
electricity network, and sewage system had achieved a 95 percent restoration of their
prewar integrity,95 a task that required the skill of engineers and specialized laborersincluding ex-Nazis. Such labor required a delicate balance between rubble removal and
repair. City engineers proceeded from the assumption that the heavy work of debris
clearance from street surfaces could not proceed in earnest until subterranean utility lines
had been repaired and resealed. Once such tasks had been accomplished and access to
these areas cleared for heavy vehicles and machinery, the grueling physical labor of
wholesale rubble removal and the hunt for reusable construction materials (bricks, beams,
steel rods, roofing tiles, etc.) could proceed in earnest.96 As 1946 drew to a close, only
80,166 cubic meters of rubble, or less than 10 percent of the Stadtbauamt's original
calculation for war-induced destruction, remained to be cleared. Thus, aside from
directing workers to seasonal tasks such as street and sidewalk snow removal or
assistance with the autumn harvest on the periphery of the city, municipal authorities had
largely addressed the most pressing tasks to which they could direct former Nazis during
the calendar years 1947 and 1948.
When the Arbeitspflichtgesetz lapsed in December 1948, the Kontrollamt der Stadt
Wien concluded that, in Vienna's then twenty-six districts, 125,604 former Nazis had
registered for labor service during the thirty months the law had been in effect. A total of
14,022 were assigned to labor-an average of approximately 467 individuals per month.97
Monthly averages would understandably have been larger during the period from the
law's introduction in July 1946 through early 1947, during which time the final sustained
push for debris clearance and fundamental repair of infrastructure-and another winter's
worth of intensive snow removal-took place. Average labor allocations would have been
far lower in the last months of Arbeitspjlicht, when the demand for cost-effective
municipal labor power eased markedly and competition for the support of reenfranchised
Minderbelasteten in the coming 1949 elections increased considerably. Moreover, the
majority of Austrian POWs had returned home from Soviet camps; virtually all had been

repatriated from Western Allied detention by late 1948, although some would remain in
custody until as late as 1955. These men represented an additional source of
labor power for reconstruction projects in Vienna and throughout the country.
Despite expressions of dissatisfaction by individual former National Socialists, their
inclusion in mandatory labor service, particularly during Vienna's first two years of
postwar reconstruction, proved important-arguably more so in the capital than elsewhere
in Austria. To what extent did labor service represent a punitive and possibly expiatory
act-or was it first and foremost the application of raw human energy to difficult tasks
without a decidedly punitive element? During the months prior to the introduction of
Arbeitspjlicht- particularly from early summer through early autumn 1945-antifascists at
the Bezirk level pressed Nazis into often haphazardly organized labor gangs oriented at
least as much toward punishment as toward coordinated and purposeful work. Despite the
confusion prevalent during these initial months of provisional government, antifascists
rather effectively targeted Nazis both "large" and "small;' ranging from notorious figures
who had not fled to petty tyrants and bullies. Faced with wild Soviet requisitioning of
Viennese labor, compelling Ehemalige to fulfill the Red Army's needs and to begin
immediate post-conflict clean-up appeared desirable and justified. If Ehemalige had
profited from the Nazi regime, they could be held responsible for the consequences of
their support with very few pangs of conscience; antifascists who assumed administrative
and executive posts at the Bezirk or Gemeinde level could take grim satisfaction that their
former oppressors, stripped of the trappings of power and privilege, now labored under
difficult physical conditions and fear of arrest by the Soviet authorities. Pedagogic
considerations did not appear to enter into serious consideration initially. Proponents of
"making an example" of former Nazis might have pointed out that the population could
see how the mighty had fallen, and that Ehemalige could reflect upon the justice to which
they had been subjected; however, there is no compelling evidence in the archival record
or frequent indication in the popular press to indicate that this consistently proved to be
the case.
By the time mayoral edicts and, in turn, federal legislation regulated the terms and
conditions of labor service, focus had shifted decidedly from retribution to
reconstruction. Ultimately, Arbeitspflicht for former Nazis-and for those in other
categories affected by the law-could never be represented unequivocally to the Viennese
population as a form of restitution to society at large. Indeed, since Austrian authorities
forbade any special badges, markers, or other designations for former Nazis or others
engaged in Arbeitspjlicht, it would have been difficult for ordinary Viennese to determine
whose labor was expiatory, unless known Ehemalige worked in their own neighborhoods.
The representative case studies I have employed suggest, moreover, that Ehemalige were
far from universally enthusiastic about either the restorative potential that their labor
would have for their own integrity or the notion that their work served as an opportunity
to earn integration into a new Austrian society. Appeals issued to the Bürgermeisteramt
from Nazis or others subject to Arbeitspjlicht indicate that most sought special
dispensations based on health concerns or references to a previous Social Democratic
affiliation. The fairly rapid evolution of Austrian denazification legislation, the
foundational myth of Austria as first victim, and the extension of the vote to the
Minderbelasteten in 1949 also circumscribed the extent to which Arbeitspjlicht served as
a meaningful exercise in civic education for those affected and for observers in a restored

Red Vienna. In the end, managing labor resources promoted initial reconstruction, but
Vergangenheitsbewültigung was sacrificed to political expediency with the April 1948
amnesty law and the restoration of political rights for Minderbelastete in 1949-a legacy
that persisted stubbornly into the late twentieth century.
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